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TORT LAW-EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE-NEGLIGENCE 
ACTION ALLOWED FOR AFFIRMATIVE MISFEASANCE-Hoffman v. 
Board of Education, 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 410 N. Y.S.2d 99 (1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Daniel Hoffman's school years burdened him with more edu­
cational injury than our judicial system could fully remedy. Educa­
tors in Queens, New York negligently placed him in classes for 
mentally retarded children for more than eleven years even though 
Hoffman always had normal intelligence. His severe speech imped­
iment misled officials to believe he was retarded. After he was 
eighteen years old, his school system realized it had blundered. By 
then, his educational, psychological, and social development was 
permanently scarred. 1 
The educators' egregious carelessness had significant conse­
quences, both for Hoffman and for school systems. Characteriza­
tion as a mentally retarded person affiicted Hoffman with a deep 
sense of self-inadequacy.2 Being treated and educated as mentally 
retarded diminished his incentive to learn and impeded his potential 
educational development. His defective self-image and feelings of 
inadequacy created depression, sleeplessness, and lack of appetite. 
Hoffman, twenty-six years old on the date of trial, had not pro­
gressed beyond his job as a part-time messenger, even though tests 
indicated he was capable of training in a skilled mechanical trade. 3 
Hoffman sued the New York Board of Education, alleging that 
the school system was negligent in placing him in classes for the 
mentally retarded and that the negligence proximately caused his 
injuries. A jury awarded him $750,000. On appeal, the New York 
1. Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 371-79, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 
101-05 (1978). Dr. Lawrence I. Kaplan, a neurologist and psychiatrist, examined 
plaintiff in December 1969. He reported Hoffman as " 'being upset, shaking, unable 
to eat properly, crying, feeling depressed, not sleeping well, walking the floors, [hav­
ing] no friends.' " Dr. Kaplan added that Hoffman's defective self-image and feelings 
of inadequacy resulted because he understood what he had unnecessarily undergone 
at school. The doctor testified that Hoffman would not overcome all the damage of 
years of educational deprivation and characterization as a mentally retarded person 
even with special education and psycho-therapeutic support. 1d. at 378, 4lO N.Y.S.2d 
at 105. 
2. 1d. 
3. 1d. at 380,410 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
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Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department affirmed 
the trial court judgment, but reduced the verdict to $500,000. That 
verdict has been appealed to the New Yark Court of Appeals. The 
appellate court held: (1) The school system was negligent in failing 
to follow a psychologist's recommendation to reevaluate the 
plaintiff's intelligence within two years after he was first placed in 
classes for children with retarded mental development; and (2) 
Hoffman was entitled to recover from the school system because he 
suffered diminished intellectual development and psychological in­
jury as a result of the school employee's negligence. 4 
The decision represents a landmark as the first American appel­
late court opinion. recognizing a common law right to redress for 
educational and psychological injuries resulting from a school sys­
tern's negligence. The handful of reported educational malpractice 
cases5 all were decided in favor of the defendant school systems. 
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District6 and Donohue v. 
Copiague Union Free School District7 exemplified the judicial re­
sistance to a tort of educational malpractice. Both decisions held 
that educators owed no duty of instructional care to students. Also, 
the courts concluded that the multiple factors affecting the learning 
process made it impossible to isolate the proximate cause of a stu­
dent's educational deficiencies. 8 
Mr. Justice Irwin J. Shapiro, writing for the majority in the 
3-2 Hoffman v. Board of Education 9 decision, distinguished this 
case from its predecessors. He found a discernible act of affirmative 
4. The employees' negligence was the school's responsibility under the rule of 
respondeat superior. ld. at 382, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 108. 
5. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Ianniello v. University of Bridgeport, No. 109349 (C.P. Conn. 
June 16, 1977); Garrett v. School Bd., No. 77-8703 (D. Fla. Dec. 5, 1977); Pierce v. 
Board of Educ., 44 Ill. App. 3d 324, 358 N.E.2d 67 (1977); Beaman v. Des Moines 
Area Community College, No. CL 15 8532 (D. Iowa March 23, 1977); McNeil v. 
Board of Educ., No. L-17207-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1976); Donohue v. 
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978); 
Fisher v. Washington, No. 833920 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1977). 
6. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). 
7. 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978). 
8. ld. at 33-34,407 N.Y.S.2d at 877-78; 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25; 131 Cal. Rptr. 
at 860-61. Courts have held that school districts do owe a duty to students under cer­
tain conditions. Tashjian v. North Colonie Cent. School Dist. No.5, 50 App. Div. 2d 
691, 375 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1975) (to supervise playground activities that could result in 
physical injury); Salyers v. Burkhart, 44 Ohio St. 2d 186, 339 N.E.2d 652 (1975) (to 
keep premises and equipment free from physical defects). The court has held that 
negligence for not supervising a student is to be gauged by the supervisor's ability to 
anticipate danger. Lauricella v. Board of Educ., 52 App. Div. 2d 710, 381 N.Y.S.2d 
566 (1976). 
9. 64 App. Div. 2d 369, 385-86, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 109-10 (1978). 
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misfeasance by the school in its treatment of Hoffman, which con­
tained the requisite underpinnings of a new cause of action in tort. 
The following facts of the case support Justice Shapiro's conclusion. 
Daniel Hoffman was thirteen months old when his father died. 
Subsequently, the child's walking and talking regressed. In 1956, 
when he was four years old the National Hospital for Speech Dis­
orders determined that he had a severe speech defect. The nonver­
bal Merrill-Palmer intelligence test administered by the hospital 
showed, however, that Hoffman had an 1.Q. of ninety, and that he 
could work well into the average and even brighter range. 
In 1957, a certified school psychologist examined him. He rec­
ommended that Hoffman be placed in classes for children with re­
tarded mental development (CRMD) because he had scored seven­
ty-four on the primarily verbal Stanford-Binet intelligence tests. 
An 1. Q. of seventy-five was the cut-off point at which a child would 
be considered of normal intelligence. The psychologist also re­
ported that Hoffman had a severe speech defect and monogoloid 
features. 1o Hoffman, in fact, was not a Monogoloid. The psycholo­
gist conceded in his report, however, that his determination might 
not be conclusive, and that he doubted some of the results. There­
fore, he recommended that "his [Hoffman's] intelligence should be 
reevaluated within a two-year period so that a more accurate esti­
mation of his abilities could be made. "11 
The psychologist's recommendation was not followed until 1969 
when Hoffman was eighteen years old. He was given a Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Adults (W.A.1.S.) test which showed that his 
1.Q. was ninety-four and that his intellecutal potential was at least 
bright normal. 12 The school claimed that 1.Q. tests had not been 
given during the thirteen-year interim because Hoffman had been 
consistently scoring poorly on achievement tests. 13 The teachers 
had assumed that he had remained retarded. The school also 
claimed that it had not interpreted the psychologist's term "re­
10. [d. at 371-77, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 101-04. "[T]he angles on each side of 
[Hoffman's] eyes formed by the junction of the upper and lower lids were somewhat 
greater than is usual among occidental children. Also, he had unusually large ears, a 
characteristic he had inherited from his mother." [d. at 371, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 101. 
"Down's Syndrome (popularly known as Mongoloidism) is associated with a variable 
constellation of stigmata, caused by chromosomal abnormality, as stated in Stedman's 
Medical Dictionary (Fourth Lawyers' Edition,1976; p. 1382) ...." [d. at 371 n.l, 410 
N.Y.S.2d at 101 n.1. 
11. [d. at 373,410 N.Y.S.2d at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
12. [d. at 376, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 104. 
13. Expert witnesses on both sides agreed that achievement tests are not the 
definitive tests of intelligence. [d . at 381 n.6, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 107 n.6. 
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evaluate" to mean "retest." The term had been interpreted to 
mean "observe."14 Worse yet, Mrs. Hoffman was never informed 
that the reason her son was placed in CRMD classes in 1957 was 
that his I.Q. had missed the cut-off by one point. Furthermore, 
the school never told her that she had the right to demand the 
15school to retest her son.
During the thirteen-year ordeal, Hoffman's only real handicap, 
a speech impediment, was not improved. Mr. Justice Shapiro con­
cluded: 
Defendant's affirmative act in placing plaintiff in a CRMD class 
initially (when it should have known that a mistake could have 
devastating consequences) created a relationship between itself 
and plaintiff out of which arose a duty to take reasonable steps to 
ascertain whether (at least, in a borderline case) that placement 
was proper.l6 
The Hoffman decision portends increasing litigation about the 
duty of instructional care that school systems owe to students. The 
advent of educational malpractice suits could be exacerbated by the 
mounting dissatisfaction with the quality of education provided in 
the nation's classrooms. 17 Even some education officials admit that 
many of our schools are not demanding that basic reading and writ­
ing skills be learned. 18 Since the mid-1960's, academic achieve­
ment tests have revealed a downward spiral in the ability of school 
children,19 and there are an estimated twenty-three million Ameri­
can adults who cannot perform such basic skills as reading a train 
schedule. 
As courts accept educational injuries as worthy of redress, 
bases for educational malpractice, in addition to the affirmative 
14. Id. at 381, 4lO N.Y.S.2d at 107. 
15. Id. at 374-75, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 102-03. Mrs. Hoffman testified at trial that it 
had never dawned on her to request that her son be retested. She had never taken 
him to psychiatrists because she said that she had never heard of them. Id. at 376, 
410 N.Y.S.2d at lO4. The decision notes that Mrs. Hoffman's education had stopped 
at the junior high school level. She had come to the United States from Germany 
when she was three years old. Id. at 376 n.4, 410 N.Y.S.2d at lO4 n.4. 
16. Id. at 383, 4lO N.Y.S.2d at 109 (citations omitted). 
17. See, e.g., Armbruster, The More We Spend the Less Children Learn, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 28, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 9, col. 1, adapted from E. ARMBRUSTER, 
CHILDREN'S CRIPPLED FUTURES: How AMERICAN EDUCATION HAS FAILED (1977); 
Jacoby, The End of a Dream: Illiteracy Invades the Middle Class, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
7, 1978, § C (Home Section), at 1, col. 1; Teaching Children at Home, TIME, Dec. 4, 
1978, at 78. 
18. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 1977, at 82. 
19. Armbruster, supra note 17. 
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misfeasance rationale relied on in Hoffman, are likely to emerge. 
Lawyers may turn to dignitary torts,20 misrepresentation, 21 or 
analogies to medical malpractice22 in formulating the foundations of 
a case. Another avenue for recovery lies in state constitutions and 
statutes that mandate minimum quality standards for public educa­
tion. 23 The potential range of theories supporting a cause of action 
for educational malpractice suits deserves closer analysis in light of 
the Hoffman breakthrough. 
II. OVERCOMING THRESHOLD PROBLEMS 
Prior to Hoffman, educational malpractice cases were uni­
formly resolved in the school systems' favor. Courts held that 
schools did not owe a duty of instructional care to students, and 
that it was virtually impossible to calculate to what extent the 
schools' acts or omissions proximately caused the students' educa­
tional injury. Undoubtedly, these threshold problems will continue 
to inhibit the expansion of legal bases for recovery beyond the 
Hoffman rationale of affirmative misfeasance. Although these 
threshold problems will be raised by courts that are reluctant to al­
low recovery based on an expanded tort of educational malpractice, 
the nature of these problems bears reexamination. 
The paucity of precedent for a legal duty of instructional care 
is not necessarily fatal to an educational malpractice cause of ac­
tion. The word "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself,24 and the courts' 
paramount concern is whether the plaintiffs interests ought to be 
protected against the defendant's conduct. Assuming that a duty 
can 8,e established, the breach of that duty must be the proximate 
cause of the injury to the student. The rule that causation must be 
shown beyond a mere possibility does not require, however, that a 
plaintiff demonstrate causation by direct and positive evidence ab­
25solutely excluding every other cause. The proper analysis re­
quires that causation be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence 
weighing in favor of the plaintiff's theory. The evidence must dem­
onstrate a reasonable probability that the defendant's negligence or 
unskillfulness was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. 26 
20. See notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text. 
21. See notes 56-68 infra and accompanying text. 
22. See notes 39-45 infra and accompanying text. 
23. See notes 69-88 infra and accompanying text. 
24. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860. 
25. Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 11,22 (1950). 
26. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 241 (4th ed. 1971). A de­
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Despite the existence of these general legal arguments that 
can overcome threshold duty and causation problems, some courts 
have crystallized particular objections to educational malpractice 
recovery. These objections fall into several categories that are fa­
miliar to students of emerging torts. Not surprisingly, these objec­
tions are refutable by equally familiar counter arguments. A brief 
summary of these arguments as particularized by the Donohue 
court will serve as a starting point for discussing the expanded 
bases of educational malpractice. 
In Donohue, the court analyzed several social policy reasons 
for concluding that there was no legal duty of care running from 
educators to students. 27 The follOwing were among the considera­
tions discussed by the court: (1) Moral considerations arising from 
society's view of the teacher-pupil relationship, and the degree to 
which courts should be involved in regulating that relationship; (2) 
economic considerations about the ability of school districts to re­
spond in damages; (3) administrative considerations about the abil­
ity of the courts to cope with a flood of new litigation, the probabil­
ity of feigned claims, and the difficulties inherent in proving the 
plaintiff's case; and (4) jurisdictional considerations about the 
power of the courts to test the efficacy of educational programs and 
oversee administration of the public school system. These consider­
ations are refutable by several familiar counter arguments. 
-Moral considerations about the sanctity of the teacher-pupil 
relationship should not preclude a court from fulfilling the common 
law tort objectives of compensating injured victims, spreading the 
risk, and deterring potential wrongdoers. As the Hoffman court in­
dicates, educational entities cannot be insulated from legal respon­
sibilities and obligations common to all other governmental enti­
fense which demonstrated that the plaintiff was largely responsible for his own 
learning deficiencies would clearly undermine the charge against the school district. 
The plaintiff, for example, may be a truant or may defy special instruction being pro­
vided for his benefit. A student of normal intelligence who quietly, stubbornly, or in­
tentionally turned a deaf ear upon instruction and summoned no initiative to learn 
would likely be considered contributorily or comparatively negligent. 
27. 64 App. Div. 2d at 33-36, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877-79. In Donohue, the plaintiff 
graduated from high school without the ability to read or write. After he was fired 
from a job because of his educational deficiencies, Donohue sued the school district 
for $5 million, charging (1) that the school district breached its obligation to properly 
educate him and (2) that the school's failure to evaluate, test, or assist him in over­
coming his learning problems violated state constitutional and statutory mandates. 
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, 11, Donohue v. Copiague Free School Dist., 64 
App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978). 
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ties. 28 Also, although the court in Donohue was unwilling to grant 
redress for a student's failure to reach certain educational objec­
tives, the court did acknowledge that "all teachers and other offi­
cials of our schools bear an important public trust and may be held 
to answer for the failure to faithfully perform their duties."29 
The economic concern that school districts' functions will be 
curtailed by liability for tortious conduct is easily rebutted. Schools 
can obtain public insurance to cover tortious liability. The courts' 
interest in increasing governmental care for the welfare of those 
who may be injured by governmental maladministration is evi­
denced by the abrogation of governmental immunity.30 Although 
some would argue that increased premium costs will decrease the 
funds which could be used toward improving the quality of educa­
tion, the desirable goal of spreading the risk of educational injury 
justifies the cost of such insurance. Furthermore, one study reveals 
that there may not necessarily be a correlation between the quality 
of education and the amount spent to provide that education. 31 
28. 64 App. Div. 2d at 386,410 N.Y.S.2d at llO. 
29. 64 App. Div. 2d at 35, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The idea that there is a trust re­
lationship between the school and the student was presented in Comment, The 
Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 695-96 (1978). The 
writer explains that the state, as settlor of the trust, reposes in the school, as trustee, 
the duty to provide the student's education until he is prepared to enter society. As 
beneficiary of the trust, the student could demand the school to justify its manage­
ment of his education. He could petition for court supervision of the trust if the 
school's actions damaged his intellectual development or infringed upon any of his 
constitutional rights. The student's rights would be held in trust until he could man­
age his own affairs. 
30. See, e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 
877 (1973). An overwhelmi;'g majority of states have abrogated governmental immu­
nity. 
Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, public employees, as a general 
rule, are personally liable for injury resulting from "discretionary" conduct within 
the scope of their employment. They do not, however, face liability for suits re­
sulting from "ministerial" acts. W. Prosser defines discretionary acts as those which 
require personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. Ministerial acts are those 
done in obedience to orders or in the performance of a duty in which the govern­
ment employee is left no choice of his own. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 988-89. 
Prosser warns, however, that the distinction is not definite or clear. He suggests that 
the test should be whether the government employee acted with proper motives and 
with due care and diligence in performance of his official duties. He should not suf­
fer for an honest and reasonable mistake in carrying out his responsibilities, nor es­
cape liability for official negligence because he has been charged with that responsi­
bility. ld. at 989-91. This test would be appropriate for resolving educational 
malpractice cases. 
31. A recent study conducted in Los Angeles showed that when one school dis­
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Fear of administrative burdens that might result from fraudu­
lent or numerous claims should not stop a court from adjudicating 
a legitimate and redressable injury.32 "The Judiciary can intelli­
gently sift the wheat from the chaff and . . . succinctly deal with 
any attempted fraudulent scheme or claim...."33 The difficulty of 
proof in educational malpractice cases may discourage many mal­
contents from bringing suit. Claims will also be dropped because 
the prospects of monetary recovery would not be commensurate 
with the expense and time of litigation. Presumably, since only the 
most meritorious claims could surmount the obstacle of proving 
proximate cause, capricious suits unable to do so will not flood 
the courts. 
The court's jurisdictional concern about interfering with the 
administration of the public school system is unjustified. The 
court's intervention in areas beyond the judiciary's traditional baili­
wick has been appropriate where there has been legislative inac­
tion leading to constitutionally unjust conditions. 34 Courts have in­
tervened on behalf of mentally ill and retarded people to protect 
those persons' constitutional right to treatment. 35 Judicial action 
was also necessary to enforce state statutory mandates to provide 
suitable free public education and equal protection to disabled or 
exceptional children who were not receiving suitable public educa­
tion. 36 The formulation of educational policy pertaining to the qual­
trict spent $150 more per pupil than another for grades 9 and 12, only trivial differ­
ences of knowledge between students resulted. M. YUDOF & D. KIRP, EDUCATIONAL 
POLICY AND THE LAw 617 (1974). 
32. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 595, 305 A.2d 877, 
883 (1973). 
33. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 231-32, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 211 (Sup. Ct. 
1976), modified on other grounds, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). 
34. Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 428, 429-30 (1977). See also, Comment, Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 
The Hidden Defect Rule, and New Patterns of Tort Law Reform in Massachusetts, 1 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 537 (1977). 
35. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afI'd sub nom. Wyatt 
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), established a constitutional right to treat­
ment based on due process. The court held that civil commitment deprives 
noncriminals of their liberty unless the government provides them some treatment. 
Id. at 784-85. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
36. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania 
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 
amended, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). These cases concern children who did 
not require institutionalization, but who received unsuitable public education be­
cause the school systems were not equipped to provide for their special needs. 
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ity of instruction may be more appropriately and effectively imple­
mented by school officials or legislators than by judges. Adjudication 
of educational negligence, however, is a substantive matter more 
appropriately left to the courts. 
Resolving matters of educational malpractice is not qualitatively 
different from other actions in tort which are reviewed every day 
by a judge and jury. It is the court's role to remedy and deter inju­
ries that result directly from educators' carelessness and 
unacceptable misfeasance. 
There are also social reasons why courts should be prompted 
to hear educational malpractice cases like Hoffman where there has 
been heedless placement of a student. Some studies indicate that a 
student's contribution to society may ultimately suffer if a school 
carelessly overlooks that student's placement. Social scientists con­
tend that inappropriate placements predictably lead to severe frus­
tration and other emotional disturbances which impede learning 
and erupt into antisocial behavior. 37 As a corollary, some studies 
show that students with learning problems are more likely to be­
come school dropouts than other students. Furthermore, 'it is ac­
knowledged that school dropouts are more likely to become juve­
nile delinquents. 38 More diligence by educators in placing students 
might, presumably, help curb the number of emotionally unbal­
anced individuals and juvenile delinquents. A school system could 
be making a valuable contribution to society by accounting for each 
student's particular educational needs. 
In the wake of Hoffman, courts hearing educational malprac­
tice suits will be more willing to evaluate the merits of future suits 
on the strengths of competing legal arguments rather than freely 
dismiss them based on unexamined social policy arguments. As 
more courts explore various bases for liability, they will encounter 
many potential sources from which an educational malpractice tort 
can be established. In addition to the affirmative misfeasance relied 
on by the Hoffman court, analogies to medical malpractice, exten­
sion of dignitary torts, theories of misrepresentation, and state con­
stitutional and statutory provisions requiring a minimum standard 
of public education all provide possible sources for expanding the 
emerging tort of educational malpractice. 
37. Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Dis­
abled Children, 12 VAL. L. REV. 253, 271-72 (1978). 
38. Id. 
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III. ANALOGY TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
Although the majority in Donohue would not recognize a 
cause of action for educational malpractice, Mr. Justice Joseph A. 
Suozzi wrote a compelling dissent. He argued that dismissing the 
complaint against the defendant school would sanction misfeasance 
in the education system. He maintained that educational malprac­
tice could be analogized to medical malpractice based on misdiag­
nosis. 39 Justice Shapiro also alluded to this analogy in his Hoffman 
opinion. 4o Just as physicians are expected to diagnose and treat spe­
cific conditions of patients. Justice Suozzi argued that school au­
thorities should be expected to detect and diagnose the nature and 
extent of a student's learning problems by appropriate and ac­
cepted testing procedures. Thereafter, they should take or recom­
mend remedial measures to deal with the student's problem. 
Donohue, according to Justice Suozzi, had a valid cause of action. 
Justice Suozzi's rationale deserves attention. 
Misdiagnosis by a physician may occur because "(a) the physi­
cian fails to discover a disease which the patient has or (b) he tells 
a patient who is free of disease that he has a condition from which 
he does not actually suffer. "41 Failure to administer the appropriate 
tests to make a correct diagnosis has prompted numerous medical 
malpractice suits. 42 Similar standards could be applied in the cases 
of misdiagnosed educational malpractice cases. Suits could result 
either because the community's accepted method of evaluating a 
student's educational abilities was not employed or because the 
student's educational ability was assessed wrongly, as was the situa­
tion in Hoffman. 
The student would have the burden of proving that the educa­
tors had a responsibility to evaluate, that is diagnose, his intelli­
gence and provide him appropriate instruction. 43 If the school 
breached that responsibility, the student would have to show that 
39. 64 App. Div. 2d at 44,407 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). 
40. 64 App. Div. 2d at 385,410 N.Y.S.2d at 1l0. 
41. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 71 (2d ed. 1978). 
42. ld. at 77. 
43. In Donohue, educators could have referred to the plaintiff's report card for 
a clear record of his educational deficiencies. A review of his grades would have in­
dicated that the student needed remedial assistance. Out of his 23 marks in high 
school, he failed seven times with grades below 65. Thirteen of his grades were be­
tween 65 and 70, and only three grades were above 80. Such a record should prompt 
a school system to administer evaluative tests. Record on Appeal at 48, Donohue v. 
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978). 
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the failure to provide appropriate instruction injured him. The ed­
ucator, like the physician, would not hold himself out as a miraCle 
worker. He would not be liable merely because the student had 
not learned, despite the appropriate action administered by the 
school system. As with medical malpractice suits, the plaintiff 
would not win his case for negligence merely because proper treat­
ment was unsuccessful. Educational misdiagnosis would comport 
with the rule that professionals should ascertain all the relevant 
facts prior to making a professional judgment.44 A consensus would 
have to be reached on the professional standards of care which 
would be required of educators. 45 
A number of courts have recognized that teaching is a profes­
sion which requires a standard of expertise from its practitioners 
beyond the competence of laymen. 46 Educators' professional stand­
ing has also been compared to that of physicians, lawyers, and 
other professionals. 47 The Georgia legislature has enacted a statute 
which states that teaching is a profession, "with all the similar 
rights, responsibilities and privileges accorded other legally recog­
nized professions. "48 Although some writers contend that teaching 
44. Moore v. Tremeling, 78 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1935). 
45. In Conley v. Board of Educ., 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747 (1956), the court 
held that "[a] board [of education] has the right to demand that a teacher know his 
subject and that he be capable of arousing and holding the interest of his pupils and 
maintaining discipline." Id. at 492, 123 A.2d at 752. A proper certificate to teach is 
evidence of a teacher's qualifications, and a teacher's license to teach may be re­
voked in some jurisdictions for neglect of duty, for incapacity to teach, or for prac­
ticing the profession fraudulently, beyond its authorized scope, or with gross negli­
gence. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6511 (McKinney 1972). 
46. See, e.g., Fowler v. Young, 77 Ohio App. 20, 30, 65 N.E.2d 399 (1945). See 
also Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by Incom­
petent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. V.L. REV. 641, 725 (1978). 
47. T. ROADY & W. ANDERSON, Foreword to PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE at vi 
(1960); R. STRICKLAND, J. PHILLIPS, & W. PHILLIPS, AVOIDING TEACHER MALPRAC­
TICE, A PRACTICAL LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR THE TEACHING PROFESSION 64 (1976); 
Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 V. PA. L. REV. 627, 630-33 (1973). 
The court in Crawfordsville v. Hayes, 42 Ind. 200, 209-10 (1873), held: "A 
teacher, doubtless like a lawyer, surgeon, or physician, when he undertakes an em­
ployment, ill}pliedly agrees that he will bestow upon that service a reasonable de­
gree of learning, skill, and care." 
The common standard applied to professionals has been reasonable care and the 
measure of skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by a member in good standing 
of his profession. See Johnston v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (phy­
sician); Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 552 (1872) (attorney); Gammel v. Ernst & 
Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 255, 72 N.W.2d 346, 368 (1955) (accountant). For the standard 
applied to architects and engineers, see Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects 
and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 711, 716 (1959). 
48. GA. CODE ANN § 32-838 (1978). 
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should not be granted "professional" status,49 one could persua­
sively argue that educators should be held to a professional 
standard of care. They undergo a certification procedure compara­
ble to other professionals; there is a process of formal training and 
specialized knowledge necessary prior to practice; and there is a 
set of intellectual, practical, and ethical standards of performance 
that is defined by members of the profession. 50 There is reason to 
propose, therefore, that students be entitled to a thorough and 
careful evaluation of their abilities and needs as conditions and at­
tending circumstances permit, with such diligence and methods as 
are usually approved and practiced by educators of the same judg­
ment and skill under similar circumstances. 51 
IV. OTHER BASES OF LIABILITY­

DIGNITARY TORTS AND MISREPRESENTATION 

Establishing a tort for educational malpractice may be sup­
ported by analogy to the "dignitary" torts of false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, infliction of mental distress, libel, and slan­
der. The harm in these torts is not physical injury, but damage to 
self-respect and resulting mental distress. 52 For example, although 
the law was slow in accepting infliction of mental distress as a tort, 
because it seemed too speculative, a yardstick was devised to allow 
recovery in extreme cases. 53 Such strict standards would be essen­
tial for educational malpractice suits in order to thwart spurious 
claims. This may be partially achieved by relying on expert testi­
mony. One commentator appropriately indicates,54 however, that 
expert testimony need not be required. Juries could presume that 
a student suffered a compensable loss if they found that the stu­
dent was denied the minimum instruction customary to the profes­
sion. 55 
49. See Elson, supra note 46, at 729-30 n.340. 
50. ld. at 730 n.340 and accompanying text. 
51. This is a variation of the standard commonly applied for cases of medical 
malpractice. See A. HOLDER, supra note 41, at 71. 
52. D. DOBBS, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 509 (1973). 
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 12, at 56, explains that the rule is as follows: 
"There is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent soci­
ety, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental dis­
tress of a very serious kind." Examples provided, id. at 56-58, include spreading a 
false rumor that the plaintiff's son hanged himself, prolonged course of hounding by 
extreme methods, and taking advantage of a person's highly sensitive disposition. 
54. See Elson, supra note 46, at 757-58. 
55. C. MCCORMlCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 14, at 53-54 
771 1979] EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 
Misrepresentation has been suggested as another basis of lia­
bility against the school system which grants a diploma to a student 
who cannot read or write. The elements of misrepresentation are: 
(1) A false representation; (2) which is made with the intention of 
inducing another to rely, or is made without any belief in its 
truth, or is made recklessly or carelessly whether it be true or 
false;56 (3) the plaintiff W;lS justified in relying on the misrepresen­
tation;57 and (4) damage proximately resulted. 58 
In determining whether reliance is justified, courts often look 
to whether the relationship between parties invites con­
fidence, such as family, business, or professional relationships or a 
great disparity in knowledge, intelligence, or training. 59 Also, the 
plaintiff's perception of the defendant's interest in making the rep­
resentation may control whether the reliance was justified. Courts 
have determined that reliance is justified when the plaintiff per­
ceives that the defendant would have no interest nor gain any ad­
vantage in making a misrepresentation. If the representation is 
made by one who is apparently disinterested, the other party may 
be off his guard. 60 
Courts have recognized a family-type relationship between 
students and educators by applying the doctrine of in loco 
parentis. 61 That relationship should justify a student's belief that 
(1935). The author explains that certain elements of injury are said to be presumed. 
The jury is allowed to infer the existence and extent of certain injury from the fact of 
the wrongdoing. Elements of damage may be proven circumstantially as well as di­
rectly. Arguments could be made that inferring educational harm circumstantially 
would leave room for fabrication and for subjectivity in awarding damages. The de­
fendant in an educational malpractice suit is spared from subjective speculation and 
prejudice because the jury must follow an objective standard of care established for 
educators. The objective standard distinguishes educational negligence claims from 
claims of mental distress. Claims of mental distress depend on a subjective determi­
nation of how outrageous the conduct is believed to be, regardless of whether any 
independent legal standard of conduct has been violated. See Elson, supra note 46, 
at 758 n.448, citing W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 12, at 55-60. 
56. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 107, at 699. 
57. Id. 
58. F. JAMES & O. GRAY, MISREPRESENTATION (pt. 1),37 MD. L. REV. 286, 289 
(1978). 
59. Id. (pt. 2), at 491-92. 
60. Id. 
61. Actually the phrase in loco parentis expresses nothing save that the 
school has certain rights and duties to children in its care. When a court 
rules that a certain act by a school official is performed in loco parentis the 
court is actually concluding that the act was permissible. When a court rules 
that an official superseded his powers in loco parentis, the court is ruling 
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the diploma presented by his educators represents his success in 
reaching a prescribed educational proficiency. A student is being 
deceived when he receives a diploma even though educators know 
he should not receive it or when educators carelessly present the 
diploma without any belief in whether the student has earned it. 
The courts should consider whether it would be an intentional mis­
representation to grant a diploma to a student who failed compe­
tency tests62 that were required for graduation, and also, whether 
it would be a negligent misrepresentation to habitually promote 
and grant a diploma to a student, like Donohue, whose grades 
were clearly on the verge of failure. 63 
In 1970, Stuart Sandow, a research fellow at the Educational 
Policy Research Center of Syracuse University hypothesized a case 
in which a nineteen-year-old student received a high school di­
ploma even though he could not read above the seventh grade 
level. The student's lawyers argued that the school failed in its ob­
ligation to provide the learning skills it implied the student re­
ceived by awarding him the diploma. 64 Sandow posed the case to 
200 lawyers in positions as legal counsel for various state offices of 
education, members of house committees, deans of law schools, 
lawyers of private firms that represent schools, and counsel for 
leading private corporations in peripheral educational activities for 
profit. 65 
Many of Sandow's respondents theorized that a mandated 
quality of education would ensue from the action,66 and eighty-five 
percent foresaw an increase in the quality of education following 
the decision. 67 Ninety percent, however, acknowledged that the 
same results might be achieved through legislation.68 
that the specific act was not legally permissible. Most simply, the phrase ... 
is no guide to action, but solely a conclusionary label attached to permissi­
ble school controls.... 
W. HAZARD, EDUCATION AND THE LAw 215 n.l (1971). 
62. For a discussion of competency tests, see notes 77-78 infra and accompa­
nying text. 
63. See note 43 supra. 
64. S. SANDOW, EMERGING EDUCATION POLICY ISSUES IN LAw: FRAUD 1 
(1970) (research conducted at Educational Policy Research Center Syracuse Univer­
sity). 
65. Id. at 3. 
66. Id. at 32. 
67. Id. at 28-31. 
68. Id. at 31-32. In addition to the tort of misrepresentation, 80% of Sandow's 
respondents predicted the case would arise and succeed in five years on a theory of 
negligence or implied contract. Id. at 20. 
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V. ESTABLISHING A MINIMUM QUALITY OF EDUCATION 
All children are clearly entitled to equality of educational op­
portunity.69 The proposition that school systems must provide a 
certain minimum quality of education, however, is not as well set­
tled in the law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized 
the importance that the quality of education plays in influencing a 
child's decision to enter or remain in school,70 or in advancing the 
student's economic and social success and development as a citi­
zen.71 The classic expression in this regard came in Brown v. 
Board of Education72 in which the Court heralded education as the 
most important function of state and local governments. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez73 the Court ac­
knowledged that innovative thinking about the methods of educa­
tion is necessary to assure a higher level quality and greater uni­
formity of opportunity. 74 
This case law in itself may be insufficient precedent to impose 
As it happened, the Hoffman decision did rely on the negligence theory. An im­
plied contract theory may not be so farfetched, considering that students have been 
referred to as consumers of schooling, who may be expected to demand certain rights 
and satisfaction as do other consumers of other products. Also, educators talk about 
education as a product and not just a process. See Sugarman, Accountability Through 
the Courts, 85 SCH. REV. 233, 236 (1974). See also Note, The ABC's of Duty: Educa­
tional Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate, 8 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 293, 312 
(1978); Note, Educational Malpt'actice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Giowing 
Problem of Functional Illiteracy, 8 SUFFOLK L. REv. 27, 31 (1979). 
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976). 
70. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1969). 
71. [T]he State is not concerned with the maintenance of an educational 
system as an end in itself, it is rather attempting to nurture and develop the 
human potential of its .children ... to expand their knowledge, broaden their 
sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free inquiry, and in­
crease their human understanding and tolerance. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White, J., concurting). See also Serrano 
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 610, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (1971). 
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1953). The court said: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and lo­
cal governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foun­
dation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening 
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if 
he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where 
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail­
able to all on equal terms. 
ld. at 493. 
73. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
74. ld. at 58. 
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a duty upon school systems to provide a minimum quality of edu­
cation. The cases certainly indicate, however, that a minimal qual­
ity of instruction is desired from school systems. To conclude that 
school systems have the right to provide an equally mediocre edu­
cational opportunity to all children would contravene our society's 
penchant for excellence. 75 
Some state constitutions and statutes provide a more fertile 
ground for developing the argument that school systems must pro­
vide a certain quality of education and that students have a right to 
demand that quality. A system of public schools is constitutionally 
mandated in each state. 76 In some states, the language which pre­
scribes school systems also indicates the quality of system that the 
legislators desire. In Illinois and Virginia, a system of "high qual­
75. Some cases concerned with constitutional issues of equal educational op­
portunity are pertinent in regard to discussing a minimum quality of education. See 
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D. D.C. 1972); Van DuSartz v. Hatfield, 
334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 
(1977); Robinson v. Cahill, U8 N.J. Super. 223, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
76. Each state constitutionally mandates a system of public schools within its 
borders. The language used in the constitutions to prescribe a system of public 
schools may be an indication of the quality of education that legislators desire. The 
following survey categorizes states according to the type of system that has been con­
stitutionally mandated: 
A system of high quality is called for in ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1, and VA. CONST. 
art VIII, § 1. A thorough and uniform system is called for in COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 
2, and IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1. A thorough and efficient system is called for in MD. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1, N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2, PA. 
CONST. art. 3, § 14, and W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1. A general uniform and thorough 
system is called for in MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 1. A complete and uniform system is 
called for in WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1. A general, suitable, and efficient system is 
called for in ARK. CONST. art. 14, § l. A general and efficient system is called for in 
DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1. An efficient system is called for in Ky. CONST. § 183, and 
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. An adequate education is called for in GA. CONST. art. 
VIII, ch. 2-49, § 1. A uniform system is called for in ARIZ. CONST. art. U, § 1, FLA. 
CONST. art. IX, § 1, IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1, MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1, NEV. 
CONST. art. 11, § 2, N.M. CONST. art. XI, § 1, N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2, OR. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 3, S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1, WASH. CONST. art. 
9, § 2, and WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. A liberal system is called for in ALA. CONST. art. 
XIV, § 256. One or more of the following terms is used to described the system 
called for in the following states. Free public, state wide, common, or general sys­
tem: ALASKA CONST. tit. 14, ch. 03, § 14.03.010, CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5, CONN. 
CONST. art. 8, § 1, HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § 1, IOWA CONST. art. 9, § 12, KAN. 
CONST. art. 6, § 1, LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ME. CONST. art. 8, § 1, MASS. CONST. 
ch. 5, § 2, MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2, MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201, Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 
l(a), NEB. CONST. art. 7, § 1, N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83, N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 1, 
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 148, OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1, R.1. CONST. art. XII, § 1, 
S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3, TENN. CON ST. art. 11, § 12, and VT. CONST. ch. 11, § 68. 
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ity" is mandated. Other states, such as New Jersey and Ohio, re­
quire "thorough and efficient"· educational systems. The Georgia 
Constitution calls for "an adequate education," and New York re­
quires "a system of free common schools." A student who could 
prove that his educational deficiencies resulted from the poor qual­
ity of the school system could construct a stronger argument for re­
lief in Illinois and Virginia than in another state which has not 
clearly defined the quality of education required. 
An increasing number of states have adopted minimum com­
petency tests77 as a means of preventing the habitual, social pro­
motions that enable illiterates to graduate from high school. As of 
June 1, 1979, New York high school students, for example, will not 
receive a diploma unless they pass basic competency tests. The 
successful completion of these tests supposedly represents compe­
tency in the curriculum of "four years or their equivalent in grades 
above grade eight. "78 It would be a statutory violation to grant a 
diploma to a student who failed the basic competency tests in a 
state like New York which mandates success on those tests as a 
prerequisite to receiving a diploma. 
77. The following states do or will require successful passing of competency 
tests for graduation. The year following the name of the state indicates when that 
legislation is effective: Arizona, 1976; California, 1981; Colorado, local option; Dela­
ware, 1981; Florida, 1979; Georgia, 1982; Hawaii, 1983; Idaho, 1982; Maryland, 
1982; Nevada, 1982; New Mexico, 1981; New York, 1981; North Carolina, 1979; 
Oregon, 1978; Tennessee, 1982; Utah, 1980; Vermont, 1981; Virginia, 1981; and 
Wyoming, 1980. See NEW YORK STATE EDUC. DEP'T, COMPETENCY TESTING IN THE 
50 STATES, at J-13, table 2 (1979). More states are discussing whether to use the 
tests. 
Thirty states have adopted minimum competency tests to determine whether ba­
sic skills have been acquired by students prior to graduation. As explained above, 19 
states, at the time of publication, used the tests as a prerequisite to graduation. ld. at 
J.-2. 
The tests, however, have been criticized in some states as too easy, in other 
states as too difficult, and in other states as culturally biased or as too narrow to accu­
rately measure school experience. The National Education Association has proposed 
an evaluation of whether the exams should be continued. See Goldman, Teacher 
Union Chiefs Urge a Halt to the Use of Competency Tests, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1978, 
at 4, col. 6. See also Goldman, Comment Sought on Graduation Standards, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 21, 1978, § C (Science Times), at 6, col. 3. 
78. E.g., 8 N.Y. CODE R. & REGS. ch. I, § 3.45 (1962) (diplomas). No high 
school diploma shall be conferred which does not represent four years or their 
equivalent in grades above grade eight, and no such diploma shall be conferred 
upon a pupil who has not achieved a passing rating in each of the basic competency 
tests established by the commissioner. 
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VI. 	 THE RIGHT TO A MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION 
SUITING A STUDENT'S PARTICULAR NEEDS 
Recent federal legislation provides school systems with a de­
tailed description of what constitutes an appropriate education for a 
handicapped or learning disabled student. 79 Schools can determine 
a student's particular educational needs by administering evaluative 
tests. Faithful use of such tests could be one means by which 
school systems could obviate potential negligence suits. Many 
school systems must administer evaluative tests as a quid pro quo 
for federal financing for education. 
School systems which receive federal funding for education 
have an affirmative duty to identify and help learning disabled chil­
dren. 80 The Education for All Handicapped Children Acts l pro­
vides financial assistance to states to identify, locate, and evaluate 
the handicapped and learning disabled. In exchange for the funds, 
the school system must provide each child "a free appropriate edu­
cation suited to his individual needs."82 Thus, a student who was 
not given evaluative tests could bring a federal cause of action if his 
educational deficiencies resulted from his school system's breach of 
its duty. It is also axiomatic that when a school system gives 
evaluative tests, it must do so with care. 
Rights to an appropriate education suited to a student's indi­
vidual needs have also been preserved by case law. The United 
States Supreme Court, in Lau v. Nichols, 83 established that equal­
ity in educational opportunity must include provisions in some 
cases for the particular needs of students. A Pennsylvania district 
court held in Frederick L. v. Thomas, 84 that children with special 
educational needs should be given the right to evaluative tests. 
The same court said in Fialkowski v. Shapp85 that it was "not in­
consistent with Rodriguez to hold that there exists a constitutional 
79. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773 (1975). For a more complete discussion of the act, see Levinson, supra note 
37, at 276. 
80. Mattie T .. v. Holladay, No. 75-31-S (N.D. Miss. July 28, 1977). 
81. See note 79 supra. 
82. Id. 
83. 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). The Lau case centered on equality of educational 
opportunity for non-English speaking children. See also OFFICE OF EDUCATION, 
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (OE) 76-00004, The Educa­
tion of Adolescents 1 (1976). 
84. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
85. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
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right to a certain minimum level of education. . . . "86 The court 
also said that retarded children may be a suspect class who war­
ranted greater judicial scrutiny than applied in Rodriguez. 87 These 
cases clearly protect the learning disabled from the omissions that 
occurred in Hoffman and Donohue. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Rodriguez, discussed the 
inextricable link of education to the enumerated rights of free 
speech and participation in the electoral process. 88 Arguably, 
misdiagnosed or undiagnosed learning disabled students are being 
denied the special instruction that they require to exercise certain 
constitutional rights. The ability to read and express oneself is in­
valuable for effectively executing the right of free speech. Also, the 
ability to read is an important step toward participating not only in 
the electoral process, but also in passing driving tests which enable 
a person to exercise his right to travel. These issues are not raised 
to sustain an independent source of conclusive reasoning to be 
used against a school system. These issues are raised for the 
school's and the court's circumspection of the rights of all students, 
including the learning disabled. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A successful educational malpractice suit derives its strongest 
support from a clear, affirmative act of negligence or misfeasance as 
the Hoffman case presented. Although the Hoffman court was able 
to place a monetary value on the damage that occurred, the rem­
edy could take other than monetary forms. A student may be al­
lowed to remain at school to receive remedial help rather than be 
habitually pushed through to graduation. A court could order a 
school district to provide a year's tuition at a private or special 
school89 or transfer the student to another public school of his 
86. Id. at 958 (emphasis added). 
87. Id. at 958-59. 
88. See Levinson, supra note 37, at 259 (citing 411 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting ». 
Constitutional protection has been given to other rights which are not explicitly 
enumerated. Privacy was recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Pro­
creation was recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Travel was 
recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Access to the criminal just­
ice system was recognized in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
89. In re Peter H., 66 Misc. 2d 1097, 323 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1971). The court held 
that a physically handicapped child who made no progress at public school in spe­
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choice. As one writer suggests90 the promise to compensate victims 
may not be the most valuable result of such suits. More impor­
tantly, school systems may be forced to confront their limitations 
and take steps to decrease the number of nonlearners. 
Judicial intervention in the administration of education is ap­
propriate where there is an unjustified educational hann that should 
be deterred and can be remedied. Courts must confront the issues 
presented in educational malpractice and must not stand idly be­
hind refutable social policy arguments. 
As Justice Suozzi suggests, there should be a tort of educa­
tional malpractice analogous to medical misdiagnosis. School sys­
tems would be responsible for evaluating or diagnosing a student's 
particular needs and providing the appropriate educational treat­
ment. School systems must also recognize that granting a diploma 
to a student who cannot read or write may constitute intentional or 
negligent misrepresentation. Overlooking or ignoring any student 
who needs special attention may encroach upon his enumerated 
rights of free speech, travel, and participation in the electoral proc­
ess. Another source for redress might ensue from injury proxi­
mately caused by a violation of statutory mandates and administra­
tive duties to provide for a student's special needs. 
Above all, educators must regard their instructional duties to­
ward students with the care and diligence of trained profeSSionals 
or accept the legal consequences for carelessness. Whatever theory 
supports the cause of action, and whatever remedy is employed, 
providing a better quality of education would benefit both 
( 
the indi­
vidual student in terms of his own educational development and 
the society at large in terms of a more highly educated populace. 
Courts should welcome this opportunity to raise the quality of edu­
cation in the United States. 
David S. Poppick 
cial classes, but who benefitted from one year at a private school should be granted 
one-year's tuition at the private school. 
90. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 68, at 246. 
